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Summary 
Background 
Consensus is growing that policy reform programs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—
an international organization mandated with upholding global financial stability and assisting 
countries in economic turmoil—produce adverse effects on public health. However, this 
consensus is unclear about which policies of these programs underlie these effects. This article 
fills parts of this gap by examining the impact of four kinds of IMF policies (fiscal policy, public 
sector employment, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and price liberalization) on public 
health expenditure, child vaccination, and child mortality. 
Methods 
We conduct time-series cross-section analysis for up to 128 developing countries over the 1980-
2014 period using observational data on health outcomes and IMF conditionality for different 
policy areas. IMF effectiveness research faces two types of potential biases: self-selection into 
IMF programs and IMF policy conditions. We deploy instrumental variables in a seemingly-
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unrelated regression framework to address both types of endogeneity, besides traditional 
remedies such as the use of fixed effects on countries and years.  
Results 
IMF policy conditions on public-sector employment are negatively related to child health. A 
change from the minimum to the maximum number of such policy conditions decreases 
vaccination (which ranges from 0 to 100) by 10.97 percent (95% CI: 1.16 to 20.79). This effect is 
robust against different sets of control variables. In addition, IMF programs increase the share of 
government expenditure devoted to public health in developing countries by 0.91 percentage 
points (95% CI: 0.15 to 1.68).  
Conclusions 
These findings suggest that IMF policies—particularly those that require public sector reforms—
undermine health by weakening the capacity of states to deliver vaccination. Therefore, 
international financial institutions need to increase their awareness of the public health impact of 
their policy prescriptions. Strengthening state capacity in times of economic crisis would ensure 
that increased health spending also delivers quality healthcare.  
Key messages 
We evaluate the effect of four types of policy conditions on public health.  
Our study deploys an innovative methodology to address non-random selection into IMF 
programs and policy conditions.  
Our analysis finds that IMF programs—particularly policy conditionality on the public sector that 
also affects doctors and health workers—adversely affect child vaccination. 
Keywords:  
International Monetary Fund; conditionality; child mortality; health systems capacity; health 
expenditure;  
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1.  Introduction  
In 2010, the Greek government agreed with the 'troika' on a bailout program over EUR 110 
billion—in exchange for committing to a number of policy conditions mandating fiscal austerity 
and structural reforms. The program adversely affected public health.1 In particular, child 
mortality increased by 43% between 2008 and 2010.2 These alarming figures prompted the Greek 
government to turn to the World Health Organization for emergency support. The Greek case 
represents one out of 131 countries that were under International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance 
over the past thirty years.3 
While many scholars have established adverse effects of IMF programs on public health,4–7 our 
primary goal is to investigate the effects of IMF-mandated policy reforms—so-called 
‘conditionality’—on health outcomes. A recent study using micro-data established that IMF 
programs erode the protective effect of parental education on child health, especially in rural 
areas.8 Yet, that study did not identify the specific IMF policies that underlie this effect. Most 
studies assume—often due to data limitations—that all IMF programs are created equal, thus 
imposing homogeneous treatment effects. In reality, this assumption rarely holds since the IMF 
designs policies to fit the macroeconomic conditions of the recipient country. Hence, the social 
determinants of health literature lacks an empirical understanding of the policy mechanisms 
linking the impact of IMF programs on health. 
Our article starts filling this gap by scrutinizing the policy design of IMF programs. We focus on 
four types of policy conditions in IMF programs, targeting fiscal policy, privatization of state-
owned enterprises, price liberalization, and public-sector employment. Based on previous 
literature and qualitative evidence, we propose that these policy conditions harbor the most 
relevant causal effect on health outcomes.9  
First, fiscal policy conditions stipulate a reduction of government spending. The IMF imposes 
these policies to reduce budget deficits—the difference between how much governments spend 
on public affairs and how much they collect in taxes and other revenues. Such measures, 
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especially when imposed abruptly, can adversely affect public health by causing under-
investment into health facilities, medical equipment, and medicines.10  
Second, the IMF promotes privatization of state-owned enterprises to increase efficiency in the 
health sector. The assumption is that private ownership incentivizes investments, which will lead 
to higher healthcare quality.11 However, the pressure for investors to make profit increases 
healthcare prices, making healthcare unaffordable to less well-off citizens and more remote 
populations outside capitals for which public services are often subsidized.12,13  
Third, IMF policies also require price liberalization, based on the rationale that doing so promises 
to increase market efficiency and the quality of service delivery.14 Although liberalizing prices 
can alleviate scarce supply of goods15–17, it also tends to imply rising prices for essential products 
such as food18, healthcare, and medicines. For example, the government of Sudan, in 1983, 
agreed with the IMF to “[…] terminate the subsidy on […] pharmaceuticals.”19 The removal of 
subsidies rises prices and tends to harm poor households disproportionately.9,20  
Fourth, public-sector conditions often require wage freezes, cutbacks in minimum wages21, social 
security, and unemployment benefits for public-sector workers.22 This class of workers include 
doctors, nurses, and midwifes.7 The IMF’s motivation to impose public-sectors conditions is to 
reduce the governments’ fiscal deficits by reducing wages and scaling back the state’s capacity in 
sectors where it assumes private actors offer better quality operations. 
The primary goal of our study is to assess the effect of these four policy conditions on public 
health. The study analyzes both the main and heterogeneous treatment effects of these policies. 
To test how these IMF conditions affect health outcomes, we use a newly-released dataset on 
IMF conditionality covering all IMF programs between 1980 and 2014.3 Our analysis focuses on 
two parts of the health system: health spending as an input to public health, and child vaccination 
and child mortality as health outcomes. Analyzing the input and output side yields a more 
complete picture of how IMF policies affect health systems. Our study also goes beyond previous 
work by deploying instrumental variables to address endogeneity. While all estimations account 
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for non-random selection into IMF programs, we also account for potentially endogenous IMF 
conditionality in further analyses. 
 
2.  Data and methods  
We collect time-series cross-section data at the country level to conduct our analyses. Health-
related outcome variables and control variables are available from the World Development 
Indicators and other standard macro-level datasets further detailed below. Our key policy 
predictors are drawn from a new dataset on IMF conditionality that extracts individual policy 
conditions from all loan agreements between the Fund and its borrowers in the 1980-2014 period 
(covering over 960 agreements in 131 countries and including over 54,000 conditions). Due to 
missing observations in the control variables, our (unbalanced) sample includes up to 128 
countries for up to 35 years, or up to 4,480 country-year observations in total. 
Outcome variables 
We examine three outcome variables: UNDER-FIVE CHILD MORTALITY (number of children not 
surviving until their fifth birthday per 1,000 live births) and CHILD VACCINATION, (average 
percentage of population vaccinated against measles, polio, and diphtheria); both proxy health 
outputs. As a measure for health system inputs, we employ health expenditure as a percentage of 
government expenditure. We derive the data from the World Development Indicators.  
Policy treatments 
To elicit the impact of specific policy conditions on health outcomes, we include (separately) the 
total number of binding IMF conditions on FISCAL POLICY, PUBLIC SECTOR, PRIVATIZATION, and 
PRICE LIBERALIZATION applicable to a country in a given year. To capture effects spawning from 
IMF programs over and above these specific policy conditions, we include a binary indicator 
indicating the presence of an IMF program. For example, adjustment programs may include 
policy measures on other economic matters that can affect governments’ public health priorities. 
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The binary indicator captures this additional effect. All IMF variables are drawn from the IMF 
conditionality database.3   
Control variables 
Studies suggest a number of control variables to block the effect of confounders.23–26 Our models 
include country and year fixed effects and hence focus only on time-varying associations. We 
include the natural logarithm of GDP PER CAPITA to capture the level of development, expecting a 
beneficial effect on health outcomes. Albeit an admittedly imperfect proxy for development, GDP 
per capita is widely used in previous studies and using alternatives such as life expectancy and 
the Human Development Index does not alter our substantive conclusions. Furthermore, we 
control for (logged) FOREIGN AID PER CAPITA. Albeit an admittedly broad proxy for external 
resources for health, this variable excludes military aid and hence should relate positively to 
health outcomes. Furthermore, as demography also affects health outcomes, we include the 
DEPENDENCY RATIO (health systems may be more strained when dependency ratios are high) and 
the share of URBAN POPULATION (health service provision may be more difficult in rural areas). 
We draw all the above controls from the World Development Indicators. Finally, we include a 
binary indicator of CIVIL WAR, drawn from the UCDP/PRIO dataset, as war may undermine the 
capacity of governments to deliver health services. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and data 
sources of all variables. 
[Table 1 here] 
Methods 
We initially proceed with bivariate analysis to assess how IMF conditions affect health outcomes. 
To that end, we only consider country-year observations under IMF programs and compare the 
average health outcomes of two groups of countries—the ones with a specified IMF condition 
over the 1980-2014 period, and the ones without. We use t-tests with unequal variance to assess 
whether the differences between groups are random. 
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To isolate the effect of potential confounding factors, we proceed with multivariate analysis. 
Figure 1 presents the causal graph27 underlying our analysis. Our relationship of interest goes 
from IMF policy conditionality to health outcomes. We allow other aspects of IMF programs 
unrelated to conditionality to have an independent effect on health outcomes. As we use 
observational data, we control for potential observable confounders that could affect both IMF 
interventions and health outcomes, as discussed above. However, this approach does not account 
for unobserved confounders or reverse causality, both of which may introduce bias.  
For instance, estimates may be biased because countries with certain characteristics affecting 
health outcomes (e.g., child mortality) select themselves into IMF programs. Self-selection into 
IMF programs is a form of confounding as such drivers of program participation are 
unobservable. In addition, IMF conditionality may be endogenous with respect to health 
outcomes, for example due to reverse causality (e.g., poor public health outcomes may make the 
Fund more likely to impose certain policy conditions). In principle, both biases can be addressed 
by deploying instrumental variables. A valid instrument is ‘relevant’ (i.e., correlates with the 
endogenous variable) and ‘excludable’ (i.e., affects health outcomes only through its impact on 
the endogenous variable). 
In our case, the more relevant source of bias is due to non-random selection into IMF programs. 
We therefore explicitly model this selection process through an IMF program equation in which 
we use a geopolitical instrument—the voting alignment of developing countries in the UN 
General Assembly with G7 countries. It is relevant because it predicts IMF program selection 
well and also excludable because it is arguably unrelated to health outcomes.28,29 To further 
improve model fit, we also include standard predictors of IMF programs such as the institutional 
history of countries with the Fund, macroeconomic fundamentals, political characteristics, 
regional dummies, and year dummies.  
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Policy conditionality is less likely endogenous with respect to health outcomes. This is because 
the Fund is unlikely to assign conditions based on health outcomes after controlling for economic 
conditions (which could jointly affect public health and the need for IMF assistance). Any 
remaining bias would underestimate our findings because the Fund arguably would reduce the 
amount of policy reforms a country must implement if the country had poor public health.  
[Figure 1 here] 
Nonetheless, we also seek to address potential endogeneity of IMF conditionality in the 
robustness tests. For each type of condition, we construct a ‘compound instrument’ based on the 
interaction of a time-invariant variable (i.e., the within-country average number of conditions) 
and a time-varying variable (i.e., number of countries under programs). As further detailed in the 
appendix, this instrument is relevant because when the IMF assists more countries in any year, its 
funds are in higher demand and so it must raise the ‘price’ of its loans by requiring more policy 
conditions from borrowing countries.29,30 The instrument is also plausibly excludable because 
deviations from the country-specific average number of conditions occur as a result of an IMF 
decision that is unrelated to a country’s health outcomes.  
Hence, we estimate seemingly-unrelated regression of up to three equations, for which we allow 
standard errors to be correlated across equations and clustered on countries to account for serial 
correlation. While we initially treat all health outcomes as mutually unrelated, we also allow them 
to be mutually dependent in the robustness checks, which increases the number of equations 
jointly estimated. We estimate all these models via maximum-likelihood using the package cmp 
in Stata 14.31 
A key concern is that IMF conditionality might undermine health outcomes in the most 
vulnerable countries that already have low capacity to deliver public services. Therefore, we 
conduct sub-sample analyses examining which kinds of countries are most affected by IMF 
conditionality. In particular, we test for effect differences with respect to democratic governance, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, low income, and weak state capacity, respectively.  
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3.  Results  
IMF programs have opposing effects on the three health outcomes. While IMF policies increase 
health spending, they tend to undermine health system capacity, with potentially negative impacts 
on child health. 
Bivariate analysis 
Table 2 suggests a generally weaker health performance of IMF countries. With regard to child 
mortality, for example, countries with privatization conditions on average have 34.49 additional 
child deaths compared to program countries without such conditions (95% CI: 13.20─55.78). 
Countries with price liberalization conditions even have 43.55 child deaths more than their 
respective control group (95% CI: 19.06─68.05). We do not find differences in health outcomes 
related to fiscal policy conditions. These raw differences do not account for potential 
confounding factors such as IMF program selection and other observable confounders.  
[Table 2 here] 
Multivariate analysis 
Table 3 presents results from multivariate analysis accounting for non-random selection into IMF 
programs. All models include fixed effects on both countries and years. While we expect the 
impact of IMF policies to be immediate (t), we allow for delayed impacts up to three years (t-3). 
Our models capture delayed impacts by lagging the policy variables.  
Our models identify that privatization tends to have an adverse impact throughout the entire 
period under scrutiny on child mortality. However, the magnitude is strongest in the year in 
which a country is under an IMF program (t), while gradually declining over subsequent years. In 
the first year of an IMF program (a coefficient of 1.114), the differential effect from no 
conditions to eight conditions on privatization—equivalent to a move from the minimum to the 
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maximum—is weakly related to an increase in child mortality by 8.91 deaths per 1,000 births 
(p=0.073).   
Public-sector policy conditions have a negative effect on child vaccination. This effect is most 
robust in the immediate aftermath of their occurrence (t), while disappearing three years 
afterwards (t-3). In the first year (a coefficient of -0.844), the effect of thirteen conditions (the 
maximum number in the sample) is an almost 10.97 percent decrease in vaccination (95% CI: 
1.16─20.79). Figure 2 shows the predicted marginal effects for the above IMF policy conditions. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Finally, our analysis of health expenditure shows that IMF programs help governments prioritize 
health in the budget up to a two-year period. This effect is unrelated to any of the four policy 
conditions studied here. In the first year, an IMF program is related to a 0.91 percent higher 
health expenditure (95% CI: 0.14─1.68).  
[Table 3 here] 
We briefly discuss the coefficients of the control variables (shown in Table B3 in the appendix 
due to space constraints). While effect size and statistical evidence vary across different outcome 
equations, we focus attention on the best-fitting model for each covariate. Due to our use of 
country-fixed effects, slow-moving covariates such as GDP per capita tend to be weakly 
associated with the outcome, except in the health expenditure equation. Foreign aid has no 
association with the outcomes, reflecting potential effect heterogeneity across different recipient 
countries. Consistent with theoretical expectations, correlates of modernization such as 
urbanization (p=0.07) and the dependency ratio (p=0.001) are negatively related to child 
mortality. An intuitive interpretation of these results is that if populations concentrate in cities, 
the delivery of public health services becomes easier. A higher dependency ratio reflects both 
old-age longevity and higher survival rates of children. Finally, civil war is adversely related to 
child mortality (p=0.017). In terms of model fit, the control variables perform well in our models 
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of child mortality (R²=0.63) and vaccination (R²=0.64), but rather poorly for health expenditure 
(R²=0.07).  
For completeness, we also discuss the results of our selection model (shown in Table B3 in the 
appendix due to space constraints). Consistent with previous literature, we find evidence of 
recidivism in IMF programs (p<0.001)—countries with a history of IMF programs tend to return 
for IMF treatment. Macroeconomic fundamentals—such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, and 
foreign reserves—are also strongly related to IMF programs in the expected direction (p<0.001). 
Most importantly, our geopolitical instrument—how well a given country aligns with the G7 in 
its UNGA voting behavior—is positively correlated with IMF program participation (p=0.003), 
hence revealing favoritism in development politics. Last, we do not find evidence for domestic 
politics—democratic governance and executive elections—in relation to IMF program 
participation.  
Finally, Table 4 presents results across different sub-samples. Our analysis indicates that 
especially the less resilient countries are more adversely affected by IMF conditionality. 
Coefficient estimates are substantively bigger in countries with lower capacity—as measured by 
income group, state capacity, and a Sub-Sahara Africa dummy. Using World Bank low-income 
country status as a proxy for low capacity, we strongly reject the null hypotheses that negative 
associations between public-sector conditions and vaccination are random (p=0.005). We also 
examine the role of democracy, which holds key to better health outcomes by increasing the 
accountability of governments to their citizens.33 Unsurprisingly, public-sector conditions 
adversely affect child mortality only within democracies (p=0.021), while we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis within autocracies. 
[Table 4 here] 
Robustness checks 
As further detailed in the supplemental appendix, we probe the robustness of our findings in 
several ways. First, we probe the sensitivity of our findings to alternative sets of controls (for 
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which descriptive statistics and data sources are shown in Table B1). Further controls suggested 
by previous literature include democracy, state capacity, population, population density, trade 
openness, debt service as of GNI, and GDP growth.23,24,32 In choosing these variables, we follow 
previous studies as closely as possible while avoiding variables with excessive missing data and 
focusing on the most plausible confounders. We do not consider variables affected by IMF 
programs to mitigate post-treatment bias. Using three alternative sets of controls, we find 
consistently negative effects of public-sector conditions with respect to vaccination, while IMF 
programs increase public health expenditure. However, the relationship between privatization and 
child mortality is not robust. 
Second, we also check if estimating models for all three outcomes simultaneously—child 
mortality, vaccination, and health expenditure—alters the results. The results remain stable. This 
approach would be adequate if there was an unobserved variable jointly affecting these outcomes, 
or, if these outcomes were mutually dependent. While health expenditure is not consistently 
associated with the two health outcomes, child vaccination and child mortality are negatively 
correlated, but the latter relationship is not due to unobserved variables because our estimates are 
similar. Yet, an additional benefit of simultaneous estimation is that we can test all implications 
of our argument in a joint F-test. In the case of public-sector conditions, for instance, the 
combined null hypothesis that these conditions do not affect child mortality and child 
vaccination, and IMF programs do not affect health expenditure can be rejected (p=0.014).  
Third, when using an instrumental-variable design to also account for potentially endogenous 
IMF policy conditionality, our statistical evidence becomes weaker. While the negative 
association between privatization and child mortality vanishes, we continue to find strong 
evidence for an adverse effect of public-sector conditions on vaccination. As is common in 
instrumental-variable designs, effect magnitudes increase (in our case ten-fold). For example, one 
public-sector condition increases vaccination by up to 10.29 percent (95% CI: 2.85─17.73). The 
positive effect of IMF programs on public health expenditure, unrelated to any IMF policy 
conditions, remains.  
13 
 
We further probe the robustness of the IV approach by using a different compound instrument, 
defined as the interaction between the country-specific average number of conditions and their 
global average in a given year. This instrument is based on the rationale that policy conditions are 
popular during specific times and diffuse rapidly at the global level. As the Fund prescribes 
policy conditions without consideration of the local country circumstances, a change in a 
country’s number of conditions is unrelated to a country’s specific circumstances. Our main 
result is robust to the use of this alternative instrument. 
 
4.  Discussion  
Scholars have devoted significant attention to upstream factors affecting public health.34 A cross-
disciplinary literature on the political economy of health—drawing on sociology, political 
science, and epidemiology—reveals adverse effects of IMF interventions.7,35,36 To identify the 
mechanisms underlying these effects, we studied the impact of four policy areas (fiscal issues, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, public sector employment, and price liberalization) on 
three aspects of the health system: child mortality, child vaccination, and public health spending.  
We obtain most robust statistical evidence for public-sector conditions adversely affecting child 
vaccination. In addition, privatization increases child mortality, but this effect decreases in our 
instrumental-variable analysis. If one believes that endogeneity is unlikely to be a problem, then 
the results from OLS regressions are consistent and efficient. In contrast, an instrumental-variable 
design is necessary if one suspects that the number of IMF conditions is driven by health 
outcomes, or that some other (unobserved) variable affects both these variables. To the extent that 
our chosen instrument is excludable with respect to health outcomes—an empirically untestable 
assumption—our result on public-sector conditions has a causal interpretation.  
Further exploring effect heterogeneity, we find that the adverse effects of IMF conditionality are 
concentrated among low-income countries (where state capacities are low to begin with) and 
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democracies (where health provision by the government is generally better due to its 
accountability to citizens).  
Taken together, these findings suggest that IMF policies undermine public health, notably by 
deteriorating the employment conditions of public-sector workers (including health personnel) 
and thus weakening state capacity. Public-sector conditions adversely affect vaccination, which 
we consider a direct proxy for the capacity of the state to reach its population and to deliver 
public services effectively. Some public-sector conditions explicitly exempt health personnel. For 
example, in its agreement with the Central African Republic, the IMF required a suspension of 
“all new civil service recruitment, with the exception of recruitment in the education and health 
sectors […]”37  as a precondition for program approval.38,39 However, these exemptions may not 
be sufficient, and they also neglect that health workers can only be effective in the presence of a 
well-functioning public administration that coordinates the various health efforts.  
Consistent with previous studies, we find governments to increase health expenditure in the realm 
of IMF programs—not due to explicit conditionality, but other aspects of IMF programs such as 
technical assistance on public financial management.9 While it is true that IMF programs often 
mandate floors on health spending,23,40,41 we find that the positive effect on health spending is 
limited to a two-year window following a program. Caution in interpreting this result is necessary 
because an increase in the budget share devoted to public health may simply reflect that non-
health spending declines even faster than health spending.  
Our study has four noteworthy limitations. First, the statistical evidence of effect estimates is 
generally low particularly for fiscal and price liberalization policies. This may be due to small 
sample sizes, or a long causal chain from IMF interventions to child mortality. Indeed, results are 
less robust for child mortality than for child vaccination, which causally precedes mortality. In 
addition, our choice of estimator seeks to minimize bias arising from endogenous policy 
conditions, which necessarily increases variance due to the bias-variance tradeoff. Second, our 
models capture the most probable timing of IMF impact on public health, up to three years from 
program initiation. However, longer time spans would be necessary to capture slow-moving 
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aspects of public health, for example, cardiovascular morbidity, obesity, and mental health.4 
Third, we examine four IMF policy conditions that theoretically most strongly relate to health 
outcomes.32 Yet, other types of conditions could be relevant for health. For example trade 
liberalization conditions which might expose countries to both global and environmental 
fluctuations (e.g. natural disasters) in food prices.18,20,42 Fourth, for reasons of data availability, 
we focus on three aspects of the health system, but public health entails a myriad of other aspects 
for which systematic data needs to be collected over longer time periods.4 Future studies could 
resolve the former two limitations; the last one would require a more substantial effort.  
In terms of policy implications, our findings suggest a need for both the IMF and governments to 
tailor policies that maintain adequate levels of health spending (input side) and to ensure that this 
spending increases the quality of the health services delivered (output side).7 In a similar way as 
the IMF has already installed health-spending floors in its programs, it could devise minimum 
requirements for the quality of public administrations and health systems more specifically. A 
renewed focus on state capacity is necessary, given the adverse unintended consequences of 
structural reform programs on state capacity.29 Furthermore, designing policies with public health 
in mind would ensure that macroeconomic recovery does not compromise people’s health. After 
all, both are closely related.  
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Figures  
Figure 1: Causal graph representing our theoretical framework. 
 
Notes: Unobserved factors are prevented from confounding the relationship between IMF programs and health outcomes due to instrumentation with UN voting alignment. 
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Figure 2: Marginal effect plots for two types of IMF conditions. 
  
Notes: Corresponding coefficient estimates are from Table 3. Thick lines show average marginal effects. Thin lines show 95% confidence interval. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and data sources. 
 
 Observations Mean Sd Min Max Definition and sources 
Outcome variables       
Child mortality 4744 81.09 64.32 4.70 336.90 Under-five child mortality (World Bank 2015)43 
Vaccination index  4465 70.35 27.32 0.00 99.00 Index of vaccination, computed as the average vaccination (as percentage of the 
population) against measles, polio, and diphtheria (World Bank 2015) 
Health expenditure 2637 10.51 4.44 0.10 34.41 Public health expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure 
(World Bank 2015) 
IMF variables       
IMF program 4612 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 IMF program being active in a given year (as all IMF variables below drawn 
from Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016) 
Fiscal policy 4577 1.13 2.68 0.00 21.00 Number of (binding) conditions on fiscal policy; includes conditions on 
expenditure policy and administration, public debt, budget deficits  
Public sector 4577 0.15 0.77 0.00 13.00 Number of (binding) conditions on the public sector; includes conditions on: 
wage and employment limits, pensions, social security institutions; excludes 
conditions beneficial to labor and social sector workers 
Privatization 4577 0.08 0.48 0.00 8.00 Number of (binding) conditions on privatization of state-owned enterprises; 
includes conditions on all activities related to the privatization of non-financial 
SOEs, liquidation of SOEs (under the rationale that government is relinquishing 
ownership), and bankruptcy proceedings of SOEs  
Price liberalization 4577 0.21 1.00 0.00 28.00 Number of (binding) conditions on price liberalization; includes restructuring of 
public enterprises, pricing policies and subsidies; regulatory reforms in utilities, 
price controls, and marketing restrictions; audits of SOEs; clearance of arrears to 
the public sector, other SOEs, or elsewhere  
Control variables       
GDP per capita  4221 7.15 1.05 4.24 9.66 GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD (World Bank 2015) 
ODA per capita 4935 3.13 1.82 -4.88 9.39 ODA per capita in constant 2011 USD (World Bank 2015) 
Dependency ratio 4636 42.58 6.33 25.65 54.29 Dependency ratio, computed as the combined share of the population under age 
of 14 and above age of 65 in the total population (World Bank 2015) 
Urbanization 4810 43.15 19.93 4.34 91.60 Urban population as a percentage of total population (World Bank 2015) 
Civil war  4925 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 Incidence of civil war according to UCDP/PRIO definition (Teorell et al. 
2016)44 
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Past programs 4935 2.08 2.36 0.00 6.00 Number of past programs over the past six years  
UNGA vote alignment 4317 0.61 0.09 0.00 1.00 Vote alignment of a country with the G7 in the UN General Assembly (Bailey, 
Strezhnev, and Voeten 2015)45 
GDP growth 4230 3.61 6.88 -64.05 106.28 GDP growth in percent (World Bank 2015) 
Reserves 3288 4.05 4.18 0.01 79.24 Reserves in months of imports (World Bank 2015) 
Freedom House index 4310 5.59 3.63 0.00 12.00 Combined civil liberties and political rights from Freedom House and inverted 
in scale (higher values are better) (Teorell et al. 2016) 
Executive elections 3814 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 Incidence of executive elections—Database of Political Institutions (Teorell et 
al. 2016) 
 
 
 
Table 2: Bivariate analysis: The difference (Δ) of health outcomes between countries treated with specified IMF 
policy conditions and untreated countries.  
 
Child mortality Δ Vaccination Δ Health expenditure Δ 
With Fiscal policy -9.919 6.524 -0.117 
 
[-31.281; 11.443] [-1.516; 14.564] [-1.534; 1.300] 
With Public sector 17.284 8.504* 0.142 
 
[-5.722; 40.29] [-0.038; 17.038] [-1.469; 1.753] 
With Privatization 34.487*** 2.174 -0.916 
 
[13.427; 55.547] [-6.093; 10.441] [-2.386; 0.554] 
With Price liberalization 43.554*** 0.235 -2.134* 
 
[19.322; 67.778] [-9.279; 9.749] [-3.887; -0.381] 
    
Notes: Cell entries give the group mean difference in the outcome (with 95% CIs) shown in the column header for 
countries with at least one condition shown in the row header compared to countries without such conditions over 
the sample period. Because all programs have fiscal policy conditions, we compare countries with above-median 
number of conditions to countries with below-median number of conditions here.  
Significance levels: * p<.1   ** p<.05   *** p<.01 
  
  
 
Table 3: IMF conditionality and health outcomes accounting for non-random selection into IMF programs.  
 
Child mortality Vaccination index Health expenditure  
 
t t-1 t-2 t-3 t t-1 t-2 t-3 t t-1 t-2 t-3 
Fiscal policy 0.037 -0.119 -0.156 -0.218 0.137 0.129 0.130 0.133 0.032 0.001 0.005 0.027 
 
(0.191) (0.201) (0.208) (0.233) (0.106) (0.109) (0.105) (0.104) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) 
IMF program 0.831 1.141 0.825 0.876 -2.026 -1.493 -1.225 -1.526 0.507 0.913** 0.938** 0.540 
 
(2.809) (2.686) (2.691) (2.856) (2.039) (2.153) (2.048) (1.923) (0.419) (0.392) (0.404) (0.431) 
Public sector 0.733 0.736 0.751 0.790 -0.949** -0.844** -0.557* -0.309 0.044 0.051 0.082 0.178** 
 
(0.53) (0.517) (0.523) (0.535) (0.431) (0.385) (0.338) (0.339) (0.077) (0.075) (0.064) (0.064) 
IMF program 0.674 0.583 0.164 0.035 -1.373 -0.902 -0.714 -1.086 0.596 0.888** 0.91** 0.532 
 
(2.815) (2.686) (2.694) (2.86) (1.982) (2.077) (1.969) (1.853) (0.426) (0.396) (0.398) (0.411) 
Privatization 1.200* 1.114* 0.991* 0.915* -0.100 -0.226 -0.082 0.001 0.005 -0.102 -0.021 0.053 
 
(0.66) (0.621) (0.572) (0.529) (0.485) (0.496) (0.468) (0.467) (0.084) (0.074) (0.06) (0.06) 
IMF program 0.660 0.603 0.219 0.127 -1.653 -1.132 -0.891 -1.202 0.617 0.94** 0.959** 0.614 
 
(2.823) (2.69) (2.695) (2.863) (1.987) (2.078) (1.975) (1.857) (0.425) (0.395) (0.399) (0.421) 
Price liberalization 0.471 0.356 0.309 0.323 0.171 0.178 0.344 0.333 0.022 0.011 0.021 0.036 
 
(0.297) (0.27) (0.28) (0.338) (0.266) (0.31) (0.333) (0.321) (0.046) (0.043) (0.033) (0.029) 
IMF program 0.737 0.707 0.317 0.206 -1.740 -1.248 -1.036 -1.332 0.607 0.91** 0.941** 0.607 
 
(2.816) (2.684) (2.693) (2.87) (1.985) (2.081) (1.985) (1.867) (0.423) (0.395) (0.4) (0.422) 
Country-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Compound instruments no no no no no no no no no no no no 
Selection correction yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3987 3868 3746 3623 3954 3835 3711 3587 2471 2468 2461 2451 
Within-R2 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.68 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Notes: Two-way fixed effects and control variables included but not shown. All explanatory predictors lagged by one period. Outcome variables shown in the column 
headers. System-of-equation maximum-likelihood estimation with an additional selection equation for IMF programs. Cross-equation correlated errors clustered by country. 
Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01.   
25 
 
Table 4: Heterogeneous effects and sub-group analysis 
 
Democracy Sub-Sahara Africa Low-income country Low-capacity country 
 
no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Public sector -0.806 -0.744** -0.506 -0.753 -0.358 -1.342** -0.536 -1.047 
 
(0.633) (0.334) (0.543) (0.519) (0.509) (0.607) (0.395) (0.653) 
IMF program -0.857 -1.990 -6.146* 0.288 -4.55* 0.143 -4.424 2.804 
 
(3.176) (2.815) (3.38) (2.995) (2.653) (2.725) (2.894) (3.207) 
Observations 2385 1233 2266 1352 2718 900 3022 596 
Within-R2 0.55 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.56 0.65 0.57 0.62 
 
Notes: Two-way fixed effects and control variables included but not shown. All explanatory predictors lagged by one period. Samples are split by the variable shown in the 
column header. For each split-sample, a system-of-equation maximum-likelihood estimation is conducted with an additional selection equation for IMF programs. Cross-
equation correlated errors clustered by country. Significance levels: * p<.1  ** p<.05  *** p<.01. 
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